Worn-out equipment usually fails one piece at a time: a power supply in one building, a card in one rack. At 3:36 PM Eastern on Friday, November 13, air traffic control centers all over the United States started losing pieces of their radar picture and their radio links at once. Eighteen minutes later the FAA stopped every departure in the country. It lifted the stop at 8:15 that night, after four hours and twenty-one minutes and thousands of cancellations.

That evening at the White House, Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy blamed old routers that “got overloaded with data.” Standing next to him, Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin said the patches and new equipment being put in had been “overwhelming the older system.” By Saturday the official account had moved toward Mullin’s version. Duffy said a contractor had been moving a line at a remote FAA site from copper wire to fiber, and the router on that line had flooded other routers in the network.

Friday’s first story blames age alone. Mullin’s on Saturday put a change at the start of it, and the difference decides what Duffy’s request for $50 billion in new equipment can fix and what it can’t. The last time this network failed across the country, in 2009, the cause was a contractor’s misconfigured router at the seam between an old network and a new one.

The network under every center

The routers sit on a private network called FTI, the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure. CBS News describes it as “the communications backbone that connects air traffic control centers and other FAA facilities,” carrying “essential voice communications and operational data used to manage air traffic.” The FAA awarded the contract to build and run it to Harris Corp. in July 2002. Harris is now L3Harris, and FTI links more than 4,400 FAA facilities. The radar picture, a controller’s voice to a pilot, flight plans and the phone lines between centers all ride on it.

Much of FTI still runs on an older scheme called TDM, time-division multiplexing, and the FAA has been moving it to IP, the packet-based protocol the internet runs on, a piece at a time. In May, L3Harris announced that the job was past halfway, that it was deploying 150 to 200 new network paths each month, and that it expected to finish in 2027. The copper is going at the same time. In September the Government Accountability Office reported that as of May 2026 the FAA had replaced “2,560 of 5,170 old and frail copper wires with high-speed fiber optic communications cables.”

So the network that failed on Friday was a building under renovation with the tenants still in it. Every one of those new paths and fiber swaps is a change to a live system that controllers are using at that moment, and the cause Duffy gave on Saturday was one of those changes.

What “overloaded” means

Duffy’s Friday explanation went like this, from the White House’s own video of the briefing: “So we have TDM telecom. So this is analog telecom. Our switches, our routers actually got overloaded with data and they went down.”

Picture a TDM line with twenty-four seats, each belonging to one telephone conversation. Eight thousand times a second the line gives every seat a turn to send eight bits, whether that seat has anything to say or not. That’s a T1 line, and every bit of it is digital. The Bell System put it into service in 1962 to carry calls digitally between telephone offices. In the nineties I worked at Ascend Communications, and the big box we sold packed 672 modems into about two and a half feet of rack. The number came straight from the phone network: a T3 line carries 28 T1s, and 28 times 24 is 672. Telephone networks were built out of these fixed time slots, and a lot of them still are.

So when Duffy called TDM “analog,” he had it backward. He may have meant “old,” and the FAA does still run analog gear in the field: its own FTI program office wrote in 2015 that radio, navigation and weather equipment use analog modems. The bigger problem is the word “overloaded.” You can’t overload a TDM line with data. Every conversation owns its seat, and the line runs at the same speed whether the seats are full or empty. A TDM switch can run out of free circuits for new calls, but a call that has its seat keeps it at full speed.

Overload belongs to the other kind of network, where nobody owns a seat. Data is chopped into packets, and every packet takes its chance on a shared line. When more packets arrive than the line can carry, a router holds them in a queue, and when the queue is full it throws the next ones away. That’s overload, and it happens on routers and packet switches, the side of the network the FAA has been building.

Duffy’s other claim was that the routers “started to give us inconsistency in the data.” A router doesn’t take readings. It forwards a packet or it drops it. Packets carry checksums, and a packet damaged on the way fails its check and is thrown away. What a congested router does to data is delay it or lose it. What a controller sees when the network underneath is struggling is missing data and late data: a radar target that freezes, jumps, or drops off the scope.

Where old circuits ride a new network

A migration like FTI’s can’t switch every old circuit off on the same day, because the equipment at the far end still expects its old circuits. The standard way to bridge the gap is circuit emulation. At one end, a device packs the TDM bit stream into packets; at the other end, another device unpacks them and rebuilds the seats, eight thousand frames a second, on time. The IETF wrote the methods down in RFC 4553 and RFC 5086, and both describe the weak point. The receiving end keeps a jitter buffer to absorb packets that arrive early or late. A packet that never arrives has to be replaced with filler, which keeps the circuit from shutting down after an occasional loss, but the lost audio or data is still gone. RFC 4553 says it directly: circuits carried this way are sensitive to packet loss.

Nothing I’ve found says which emulation method FTI uses, so treat this as how such a bridge generally works. But the FAA’s own FTI program office described the same weakness in its 2015 paper on moving from TDM to IP. Without TDM’s timing, it warned, systems “may experience out-of-sync clocks leading to buffer overflows, lost frames, and variable latency.” On the radios, it said, losing a single packet carrying 20 milliseconds of audio leaves the radio “unavailable to air traffic controllers” for two to four seconds. It concluded: “Having a stable, uncongested network is a must.”

Eleven years later, CBS’s senior government sources described symptoms of the kind the paper warned about. According to them, routers manufactured between 2001 and 2006 “essentially got overwhelmed, and started feeding out-of-sync data packets into the larger air traffic control system. That causes static over voice communication lines and can cause screens to flash or go to black.” CBS, citing multiple sources, also reported that “an update to the private communications network that connects America’s air traffic control system caused the system to reboot, leading to a crash and a communications outage.”

If FTI carries old circuits across its packet network by circuit emulation, out-of-sync packets and static on the voice lines are what a failure at the point where old meets new would look like: the far end stops getting packets on time and can’t rebuild the circuit.

What Saturday’s account says, and what it doesn’t

On Saturday, Duffy went further. NPR reported that L3Harris “was doing routine maintenance in at least one of FAA’s remote locations changing copper wire to fiber,” and that Duffy said the routers in these facilities were manufactured in 2001. Scripps News quoted him describing the copper line as “nearing the end of its service life and scheduled for discontinuation.” And CNBC gave the mechanism as Duffy described it: when a router was switched from copper to fiber-optic cable, it “flooded” other routers in the air traffic control system with over 1,000 connection attempts roughly every five seconds, creating problems with airplane communications and radar feeds.

That rate works out to about two hundred a second. Neither Duffy nor anyone else has said what kind of connection attempt it was, so what follows is how routers generally behave. On most routers, traffic addressed to the router itself, such as a request to open a session, is handled by its general-purpose processor, which is far slower than the hardware that forwards everyone else’s packets. A processor busy with a flood of requests can fall behind on the sessions it already holds, and when it misses enough of them, its neighbors decide it’s gone and start rerouting around it. Modern routers can rate-limit traffic to their own processor for exactly this reason. Nobody has said whether the routers on FTI had such limits, or had them turned on.

Whatever started at that one site spread. FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford said no FAA facility went dark, but flights were grounded because of “instability” in the information feeds, and he explained why: “We were unwilling to take any risk that this propagation could actually result in a center losing connectivity with aircraft.”

Duffy also said, according to NPR, that the cause wasn’t settled: “What we’re working to determine was whether we had incompetence, meaning was it user error, installator error from L3Harris, or did they install a faulty router?” L3Harris didn’t respond to NPR’s request for comment.

Duffy’s account is preliminary, and the previous nationwide ground stop shows how far a first explanation can move. In January 2023, on the day the FAA’s system for notices to pilots, known as NOTAM, went down, the FAA traced the failure to “a damaged database file.” Eight days later its preliminary review found that “contract personnel unintentionally deleted files while working to correct synchronization between the live primary database and a backup database.” Saturday’s account may change the same way. Mullin’s “patches,” CBS’s “update” that caused a reboot, and Duffy’s copper-to-fiber cutover are compatible, and nobody official has yet joined them into one story.

The best case for blaming age

My video, embedded above, argued that the timing points at a change. Saturday’s account supports that, and it also hands the case for age its best evidence.

By the official account, the trouble started in a router built in 2001, on a copper line the FAA was replacing because it was wearing out. If a modern router, with modern protection against floods, had been on that line, the same cutover might have been a non-event. You can’t upgrade a network like this without touching it, and the FAA is moving off copper because the copper is dying. Leaving old copper in place has costs too, and the backups for at least one busy airspace haven’t always worked. The DOT inspector general found that on April 28, 2025, controllers working Newark’s airspace lost radar and radio contact for about 90 seconds “due to a burnt copper wire,” and that a second 90-second outage on May 9 came from “failures of both primary and redundant communication infrastructure.” In September of this year, a primary circuit failed at the Philadelphia facility that now handles Newark’s airspace, and when it switched to the backup, Bedford said, “we discovered the backup fiber had a break.” A construction crew had cut it.

The GAO’s audits are the strongest institutional evidence for this side. In 2024 the GAO reported that of the FAA’s 138 air traffic control systems, 51 were unsustainable and 54 more potentially unsustainable, citing “outdated functionality, a lack of spare parts, and more.” (That’s 105 in all. The GAO doesn’t name them, for security reasons, so nothing in the report says FTI is one.) The FAA’s own 2015 paper warns that circuits built around TDM’s timing suffer on a packet network. On this view, a fragile network, where trouble in one place easily reaches the rest, is what turns one bad router into trouble at centers across the country, and the fragility comes with age.

All of that explains why Friday’s failure was possible. What it can’t explain is why it happened at 3:36 PM on November 13 and not on November 12, or on any of the thousands of afternoons before it. The two earlier national failures I can find, the 2023 NOTAM outage and the 2009 FTI outage described below, both began with a contractor changing something. Duffy’s own Saturday account names a change as the trigger.

Nor does the case for age explain how a flood from one remote site reached centers all over the country, the spread Bedford called propagation. A network built for safety is supposed to keep a fault where it starts. Whether this one couldn’t because its design is old, or because nothing stopped the changed equipment from flooding its neighbors, is a question the investigation hasn’t answered, and it’s the one that decides what the fix is. Age is also the argument for the money. Duffy tied even Saturday’s contractor story to funding (“the investments haven’t been made”), so his account of the cause and his request for money point the same way.

The same network, seventeen years earlier

FTI has failed nationally before. On November 19, 2009, an outage of FAA telecommunications hit 129 of the nation’s air traffic facilities. In a June 2010 letter to Congress, the DOT inspector general explained what happened. Harris was “transitioning FTI Internet Protocol (IP) services from a legacy network to the new FTI Operations Internet Protocol (OPIP) fiber optic network.” To bridge the two, it used temporary routers it called Logical Transition Bridges, and a Harris engineer “incorrectly configured one of several temporary routers.” The error caused the network to send air traffic data on the wrong routes, “which blocked approximately 75 percent of the routes across the FTI fiber optic network.” The error “went unnoticed and ultimately created a ‘domino effect’ across the FTI network.”

Saturday’s account has the same parts: a contractor moving the network from old copper to new fiber, one router in the middle of that move, and a fault that spread from it across the country.

The 2009 outage hit flight plan data, and the FAA noted that radar and communication were not affected; this time they were. The 2009 router was a temporary one put in for the transition, and neither the inspector general nor the review panel blamed its age. The inspector general also found that restoring service took longer than it should have because “an automatic tool that alerts technicians to network failures and their locations did not work as intended,” and that the “FAA was unaware that Harris officials had configured the network in error and made other procedural errors.” The letter notes that the “FAA does not own the network, and its contract with Harris is essentially a 15-year lease.” And it records a warning: “both FAA and Harris officials acknowledged that there is still a risk of critical outages as new NextGen services are added to FTI’s new fiber optic network.” Among the FAA review panel’s recommendations was the “use of new automated tools for making configuration changes to network devices.”

How a live network is supposed to change

FAA Order 1800.66A, the agency’s configuration management policy, requires an impact analysis before any proposed change to the National Airspace System, covering operational risk, the effect on reliability and availability, and “safety risks and mitigating plans.” Every change proposed through that process “must be evaluated to determine whether an SRM panel is required,” SRM being safety risk management. Whether the copper-to-fiber work at that remote site went through this process, or through L3Harris’s own change process under the contract, neither the FAA nor L3Harris has said.

In May, L3Harris described its approach as “build-then-switch”: “installing new infrastructure while the old system runs, testing it extensively in parallel, then cutting over during carefully coordinated low-traffic periods with full backup systems in place.” Nobody has said what time the router on that remote line was switched over. The trouble began at 3:36 PM, and in Duffy’s account the flood began when the router was switched. If the switch was made that afternoon, it broke the contractor’s own stated method. On CNN’s live coverage, Anna Giaritelli of the Washington Examiner, who said she was in touch with controllers, relayed what they had told her: “these types of switches they’re doing that the FAA is doing, they don’t happen during the day. They don’t happen during busy times like a Friday afternoon. They’re doing these midweek, middle of the night when there is no air traffic going on.”

On Reddit, in one big r/technology thread, the top comment, with more than 7,700 upvotes, said: “Never push to prod on a Friday.” The reply under it: “Especially not on Friday the 13th.”

Cutting over a live network that can’t go down
  1. Analyze before you touch it. Write down what the change could break, including the old equipment it will talk to, and decide what you’ll watch to know it’s working.
  2. One site first. Make the change at a single key site and watch it before a second site sees it.
  3. The quietest hour you have. Overnight, midweek. Never a busy Friday afternoon.
  4. Keep the old path live. Run the new path in parallel and cut over only when it has proven itself.
  5. A way back in minutes. Rehearse the rollback, and agree in advance what result triggers it, so nobody debates it while the radar picture is freezing.
  6. Contain the blast. New or changed equipment should be unable to flood its neighbors: rate limits on traffic to each router’s processor, and segments that keep a fault where it starts.
  7. Tell the people using it. The controllers on shift should know a change is happening and what it looks like when it goes wrong.

The video ended on one site, the quietest hour and a way back. After Saturday’s account, containment belongs next to them, because a cutover can go wrong at any hour. What turned this one from a bad afternoon at one remote site into a national ground stop was that its fault could travel.

What the money buys

In the Friday briefing, Duffy’s answer to the outage was money. He had already asked for $30 billion; on Friday he said, “I want $50 billion.” He noted that Congress gave the FAA $12.5 billion for air traffic control last year. The old system does need replacing, as the GAO said in 2024. But the GAO’s most recent report on the replacement program, published in September, also warns about how the work gets done. The FAA, it found, “could be prioritizing speed over costs and air traffic disruptions.” It has no integrated master schedule for the program’s first phase. “Instead, FAA has 11,389 individual project schedules that are not integrated. As a result, individual projects are scheduled for installations at the same sites, generally without optimizing the schedules to reduce impacts to controller operations.”

More money buys more installations and more cutovers, each one a change to a system that’s running while it happens. Duffy said on Friday night that there would be more outages like this one: “you will have more of these.” If cutovers keep going the way Friday’s apparently did, he’s right.

On Saturday, Duffy said of the copper-to-fiber work, “Just maybe the FAA is the last one to be doing this work because the investments haven’t been made, but this is not complicated.” Uncomplicated work, done the way the contractor says it does it, in a low-traffic window, at one site, with containment and a way back, doesn’t stop every departure in the country.

You can watch the video here. More, including my latest book, is at davesaunders.net.

Sources